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First Mover or Higher Quality?





Conventional wisdom holds that in markets with positive feedbacks be-
ing first to market can matter more than product quality. In this paper, we
test that intuition within a generalized Pólya urn model. We find that if we
assume constant feedbacks, in the long run higher quality products domi-
nate the market regardless of initial market shares, contradicting the com-
mon wisdom. However, when we allow for variable feedbacks, we find that
initial advantages persist almost indefinitely. Thus, the choice of whether to
rush to market or focus on quality depends on market characteristics such as
whether the positive feedbacks result from more consistent returns to scale
or from more variable social influences.
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1 Introduction
Positive feedbacks, including network externalities, learning curves, information
cascades, increasing returns, and social learning, reinforce established leads. Con-
ventional wisdom suggests that in these markets opening an early gap on competi-
tors is critical to long run success. And yet, late entrants, Facebook, Google, and
the iPhone dominate industries with strong positive feedbacks.
The dominance of Facebook’s social network, Google’s search engine, and
Apple’s iPhone support a more standard economic logic: in the long run quality
dominates. In this paper, we compare these competitive strategies in markets
with positive feedbacks. We ask which matters most: getting to market first or
having the highest quality product? We find that the answer depends on market
characteristics that influence whether the feedbacks will be constant or variable.
The strategy literature predominantly supports the first strategy, arguing that in
positive feedback markets firms should enter early and employ aggressive tactics
for building an installed base. While actions such as deep discounting, heavy
advertising, and rapid expansion are costly in the short term, they can pay off in
the medium to long term by eliminating competitors and “locking-in” the market.1
1See, for example, Spence (1979, 1981); Fudenberg and Tirole (1983, 2000); Grindley (1990);
Besen and Farrell (1994); Arthur (1996); Shapiro and Varian (1999); Farrell and Klemperer (2006).
Many of these authors take care to note that the prescription relies on certain competitive condi-
tions being satisfied, the key criterion being that the positive feedbacks do not spillover (too much)
to other competing firms. For example, in the case of network externalities individual products
must be highly incompatible (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000). In the case
of the learning curve, knowledge spillover between firms reduces the advantages gained through
aggressive strategies (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1983; Ghemawat and Spence, 1985). Because feed-
backs in the model we employ accrue only to a single firm, the model gives the aggressive strategy
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Some research even suggests that markets can lock-in to inferior technologies
although superior alternatives are available (e.g. David, 1985; Farrell and Saloner,
1985; Arthur, 1989; Cowan, 1990; Cowan and Gunby, 1996). Thus, it may be
worthwhile to allocate resources away from quality-focused activities like market
research, product development, and testing in favor of early product launches and
aggressive marketing (Watts and Hasker, 2006). In describing what strategies
are not important for competition in a standards contest Grindley (1990) goes
so far as to say, “... technical development and product quality are surprisingly
unimportant.”
A second collection of scholars challenges that inference and argues that, in
the long run, markets select the best products (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1990,
1994, 1995, 2001). They advocate a strategy of focusing on quality rather than
being first to market. From this perspective the advantages gained through ag-
gressive marketing tactics are not only costly, but fleeting, and improvements in
quality should never be sacrificed for early advantage. These scholars dispute his-
torical accounts and theoretical arguments that claim lower quality products can
dominate the market. For example, Liebowitz and Margolis (1990) question the
conventional wisdom that the Dvorak keyboard layout is technically superior to
the more standard QWERTY keyboard, while David (1985) and others cite this as
a prime example of lock-in to an inferior technology. The “quality always domi-
nates” argument is supported by an experimental study conducted by Hossain and
Morgan (2009), which found that even if an inferior product enjoyed a substantial
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To tackle the question of whether higher quality or early entry matter most, we
employ the standard framework for modeling positive feedbacks, the generalized
Pólya urn model (Johnson and Kotz, 1977; Pemantle, 2007) which we analyze
using both mathematical and computational techniques. Urn models are a classic
(and, by students, often loathed) tool of basic probability and statistics courses
in which probabilities are represented by the chances of pulling a ball of a given
color out of an urn filled with balls of various colors. Social and market forces
are represented by rules for adding or subtracting balls from the urn based on the
color of the drawn ball.
The standard Pólya urn model is a special case in which there are two colors
of balls and when a ball of a given color is drawn it is replaced along with an ad-
ditional ball of the same color. This simple framework has become the canonical
representation of processes with positive feedbacks in applications ranging from
markets (Arthur, Ermoliev and Kaniovski, 1983) to the development of neurons in
the brain (Khanin and Khanin, 2001). The generalized Pólya urn model extends
this to situations with more than two colors, and if a ball of color c is drawn, it is
returned to the urn along with ρc > 0 balls of color c. When modeling product
competition, the parameter ρ functions as a proxy for quality: purchases of higher
quality products result in more balls being placed in the urn.
Using this model we find that, contrary to the recommendations of the domi-
nant strand of the strategy literature, establishing an early lead proves less effective
than producing a higher quality product in relatively short time, and, therefore, in
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by those with higher quality, and as time goes to infinity the higher quality prod-
uct almost surely captures the entire market. Thus, the success of products like
Facebook, Google, and the iPhone may potentially be explained by the fact that
these firms simply had better products, and thus higher feedbacks, than their once
larger competitors.
We then extend the model to include stochastic feedbacks. For reasons of
tractability and parsimony, most models of positive feedback markets assume that
each purchase has the same effect. That assumption makes sense if the feedbacks
result from, say, cost reductions due to returns to scale.2 If, though, the positive
feedbacks result from social influence, then heterogeneity of consumer prefer-
ences, asymmetries in influence networks, or variance in product quality would
create a distribution of positive feedbacks.
This variability might be thought to cancel out; however, here we show that
not to be the case. As the variability in feedbacks increases, the durability of an
initial advantage does as well. In the limit, the firm with the highest mean feed-
backs still almost surely captures the market, but when feedbacks are uncertain, a
firm with an initial advantage may dominate for all reasonable time scales. Thus,
our model suggests the optimal competitive strategy depends on the nature of the
positive feedbacks. In markets in which feedbacks have a high degree of consis-
2In some models this effect changes over time, but it does so deterministically (e.g. Spence,
1981; Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Kalish and Lilien, 1986). Weyl (2010) and White and Weyl (2016)
(discussed further below) consider the impact of deterministic heterogeneity in network effects on
equilibrium pricing in am model of multi-sided platform competition. Lamberson and Page (2012)
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tency or certainty, a quality strategy dominates; in those with variable or uncertain
feedbacks, a “get big fast strategy” is more likely to succeed.
Our findings are complementary to a stream of research on what White and
Weyl (2016) call “insulated platform competition.” This literature argues that
late entrants offering superior products can (and do) retake markets from infe-
rior incumbents through the use of temporary subsidies that incentivize consumer
switching (Dybvig and Spatt, 1983; Weyl, 2010; Weyl and White, 2014). In many
respects, this “usage revenue later” strategy is like the initial advantage strategy
explored in our model in which a firm focuses on building a large installed base,
possibly at a cost, in hopes of reaping the rewards from dominating the market
later. The difference is that rather than using a get big fast approach to establish
an advantage before competing firms gain an upper hand, the insulating strategy
is used to overcome an initial deficit after a less attractive alternative has already
established a lead. Because higher quality products are preferred, all else equal,
the cost to subsidize consumer switching is lower for more efficient products.
Our model takes a starker approach to firm strategy, focusing directly on the
relative benefits of establishing an initial advantage versus producing a higher
quality product (and later on producing a product with more consistent feedbacks),
leaving aside questions of strategic pricing. But, even without pricing our model
findings agree with the broad conclusion of the insulated competition literature
that lock-in to inefficient outcomes in markets with positive externalities is less
likely than may be commonly believed (Weyl and White, 2014). However, our
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strategies, is sufficient to explain why late entering firms can come from behind
to overtake dominant but inferior incumbents. Moreover, our results raise another
key variable, the variability in consumer feedbacks, that may interact with product
quality to impact the necessity or effectiveness of an insulating strategy.
The horse race structure of our paper implies a tradeoff from entering early
or having higher quality. That tradeoff almost certainly exists as more time in
product development and testing should produce a higher quality product, with
the caveat that a firm might gild the lily. Other strategic decisions need not require
a tradeoff. For example, our model suggests that high quality producers also have
an incentive to increase the consistency of the positive feedbacks, a strategy we
take up in the penultimate section of the paper.
2 A Model of Markets with Positive Feedbacks
We model competition among a set of M firms with positive feedbacks using a
generalized Pólya urn model (Pemantle, 2007). Similar urn models have been pre-
viously employed to study competing firms as we do here (Lamberson and Page,
2012), and a wide range of other phenomena including criminal behavior (Green-
berg, 1991), box office success of movies (De Vany and Walls, 1996), the impact
of recommender systems (Fleder and Hosanagar, 2009), group problem solving
(LiCalzi and Surucu, 2012), the growth of networks such as the world wide web
(Levene, Fenner, Loizou and Wheeldon, 2002), and many others (Johnson and













This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
We describe the model using a ball and urn metaphor to build intuition. The
formal model allows for such things as the probabilistic addition of fractional
balls. An urn contains balls of M different colors. Each color corresponds to one
of M competitors in the market. These can be thought of as either products or
firms. As we analyze strategic behavior in a market, we refer to the competitors
throughout as firms. Let Sti denote the number of balls of color i in the urn at time





the fraction of balls of color i at time t. To
simplify notation we drop the superscript 0 when referring to the initial value of
any of the time dependent variables in the model, so the initial state of the urn is
given by
S = (S1, . . . , SM).
We require Si > 0 for each i.
The state of the urn serves as a gauge of the mood of the market – a firm’s
proportion of balls in the urn, Rti, corresponds to the probability that a consumer
at time t + 1 will purchase a product from firm i. Depending on the industry
under consideration, the state of the urn may result from consumer reviews on the
World Wide Web, word-of-mouth communications, network effects, or publicity.
We call a firm’s initial share of balls in the urn the firm’s initial market presence.
Given the structure of the model, a firm that begins with more balls in the urn will
have an initial advantage,
At each time t = 1, 2, . . ., a ball is drawn from the urn, representing a purchase













This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
random variable xt that takes values in {1, . . . ,M} (we also denote the realization
by xt) where,
Pr(xt = i) = Rt−1i i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. (1)
The ball is then returned to the urn along with some number of balls of the same
color as the drawn ball. These additional balls create a positive feedback, making
it more likely that future drawn balls will be of the same color xt, i.e. more likely
that future consumers will purchase a product from the firm xt.
The level of this positive feedback is specified by a vector of transition weights
ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρM).
Each ρi is a non-negative real valued random variable with finite support. At each





St−1i + ρi for i = x
t
St−1i for i 6= xt
. (2)
This positive feedback could result from a variety (or a combination) of mech-
anisms including word-of-mouth recommendations, increasing returns to scale,
diffusion of awareness, or social learning. Modeling these feedbacks as proba-
bilistic allows us to represent situations in which, for example, a consumer chooses
to recommend a product with some probability, or where there is variability across
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which assumes constant feedbacks that occur with certainty. We expect that some
sources of positive feedback, such as word-of-mouth, might have more variability
than others, such as returns to scale.
As the process unfolds, we keep track of the total sales of each firm, repre-





In our analysis, we examine the consequences on expected market shares of
varying assumptions regarding the initial state of the urn and the transition weights
on these outcomes in both finite time and in the limit. Mathematically, the antic-
ipated market shares correspond to the expected values of random variables pro-
duced by the urn process. We denote the expectation of any of these variables by
using a bar, and dependence on the initial state and the transition weights using
square brackets. For example,
X̄ t[S; ρ]
denotes the expected outcome vector at time t with initial state S and transition
weights ρ.
3 Two Strategies: Initial Advantage and Quality
Our initial analysis compares two strategies, an initial advantage strategy and a
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relative to a competitor. We analyze which results in higher market share. Proofs
of all of the results can be found in the supplementary online appendix.
3.1 Initial Advantage
The initial advantage strategy is modeled as an increase in a firm’s initial share
of balls in the urn – the firm’s initial market presence. In practice, a firm might
increase its initial market presence by being first to market, through advertising,
offering discounts to early adopters, or “seeding” the population by giving away
samples. Some firms may begin with higher market presence than others because
of reputation spillover from previous products. Increasing a firm’s initial market
presence increases its expected market share after any finite time. (The result is
straightforward, but for completeness we prove this as Theorem 1 in the supple-
mentary online appendix.)
The exact probability distribution in the infinite limit assuming all firms have
constant transition weights equal to one was derived by Blackwell and MacQueen
(1973). They show that if ρ1 = · · · = ρM ≡ 1, then the shares of balls in the
urn (and thus the long run market shares) Rt1, . . . , R
t
M converge almost surely to
R∞1 , . . . , R
∞
M with distribution
Γ(S1 + · · ·+ SM)





The multivariate distribution in equation (4) is a Dirichlet distribution with
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when all of the firms have equal initial market presence, i.e. S1 = S2 = · · · = SM ,
any collection of market shares that sum to one is equally likely to occur. Second,
for all values of S1, . . . , SM , all points in the domain of the distribution have
positive support. Third, the distribution varies smoothly with the Si.
In other words, increasing a firm’s initial advantage smoothly transforms the
long term probability distribution, but with equal feedbacks there is a positive
probability of convergence to any collection of market shares regardless of how
far ahead or behind the firms start out. No level of initial advantage results in a
guaranteed winner-take-all outcome. Given the abundance of literature linking
positive feedbacks with lock-in of a single product, many may find this result
surprising.3 As we describe in Section 4, the key to locking in the market in the
long term is not an initial advantage, but rather a quality advantage.
3.2 Quality
We next consider quality. We assume that the level of a firm’s feedbacks correlate
with quality; the higher the quality of the product, the more individuals who pur-
chase the product recommend it to others. Thus, we model the quality strategy as
an increase in the average feedback that results from a single purchase. Intuitively,
increasing a firm’s positive feedbacks also increases its market share. (The result
is straightforward, but for completeness we establish this formally in Theorem
3The common identification of positive feedback urn models with lock-in most likely comes
from the well-known work of Arthur (1989). In Appendix A we explain how Arthur’s urn model
differs from the standard Pólya urn model and how these differences produce the winner-take-all
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2 in the supplementary online appendix.) If we identify higher feedbacks with
higher quality, then higher quality products have higher expected market shares
after any finite time. We discuss the long term implications of a quality strategy
in the next section.
4 The Horse Race Between Quality and Early Entry
Having defined two strategies for gaining competitive advantage in markets with
positive feedbacks, we turn to a comparison of their relative strength. We show
that which strategy provides the greatest advantage depends on the context in pre-
dictable ways. In particular, while most strategy recommendations focus on the
long run benefits of establishing an initial advantage, we find that the greatest re-
wards of an increase in initial market presence are realized in the short run. In
contrast, we find that the advantages of the quality strategy accrue in the long run.
The distribution in equation (4) shows that in the long run the initial advantage
strategy smoothly increases expected market share but cannot guarantee market
dominance. An established but rarely cited result (originally proven by Athreya
(1969), see also Johnson and Kotz (1977)) from the literature on branching pro-
cesses implies that a product that dominates on quality necessarily captures the
market in the long run regardless of any competitors’ initial advantages.
Theorem 1. (Athreya, 1969) If E[ρj] > E[ρi] for i 6= j, then as the number of
purchases approaches infinity, firm j’s market share approaches one.
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Firm Q Median Share After 100 Sales
Firm Q Feedback




Firm Q Median Share After 10,000 Sales
Firm Q Feedback









Figure 1: Initial advantage versus Quality (level of feedback). Firm Q has feed-
backs ranging from 1 to 2 shown on the horizontal axis. Firm IA has feedback 1
and an equal, double, or five-fold initial advantage represented by the three lines
in the graph.
run a superior quality product will overcome any deficit in initial installed base and
come to dominate the market. It is important to keep in mind that this theorem
describes the limiting distribution. It states that eventually the highest feedback,
i.e. highest quality, firm captures the entire market. It gives us no insight into how
many periods are required for the highest feedback firm to gain a majority of the
market, or what other outcomes are possible or likely in finite time.
To compare the relative advantages of initial advantage and quality in finite
time, we examine the outcomes from 1000 simulations of the model with two
firms. The first firm, “Firm IA,” takes an initial advantage strategy and the second
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as an increase in the initial market presence for Firm IA and we vary the firm’s ini-
tial advantage from an equal to a five fold advantage over Firm Q’s initial market
presence. Firm Q’s quality strategy is modeled by increasing the firm’s transition
weights from equal up to double the transition weights of Firm IA.
Figure 1 plots the median share for Firm Q for varying strengths of the qual-
ity and initial advantage strategies. Whenever the line lies above the .5 level, the
quality strategy yields a higher market share in more than half of the simulations.
As the figure shows, the advantage of greater initial market presence only endures
when the levels of feedback are very similar. After only 100 purchases, the ben-
efits of greater feedbacks dominate those of early advantage for most feedback
levels. After 10,000 purchases, even a slight advantage in feedbacks outweighs
all but the largest advantages in initial market presence. For example, a firm with
30% higher feedbacks is effectively on equal footing with a firm that started with
a five fold initial advantage.
Notice that while the computational results in Figure 1 depict only two com-
peting firms, a straightforward argument detailed in the following lemma allows
us to generalize the intuition to any number of firms.
Lemma 1. The expected sales of a firm competing withM−1 other firms is equal
to the expected sales of that firm competing with a single other firm,
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where
ρ̂2 = ρi with probability
Si∑M
j=2 Sj
for each i = 2, . . . ,M .
This lemma follows immediately from the construction and allows us to re-
duce the case of a firm competing with M − 1 other firms to a firm competing
with only one other firm. What is perhaps most interesting about the case of more
firms is that it tends to have a larger effect on the initial advantage strategy than
the quality strategy. This follows from the fact that adding more firms necessarily
dilutes the average market share.
Both Theorem 1 and the computational results shown in Figure 1 contradict
the dominant thinking for strategy in markets with positive feedbacks where es-
tablishing early advantage is the standard recommendation. Scholars urge firms to
focus on the “life-cycle” of their products; they suggest that companies should in-
vest money in establishing an installed base and recoup their investments through
later sales to locked-in customers (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Our analysis cau-
tions against this strategy, particularly if investments in the installed base come at
the expense of quality improvements that could result in higher feedbacks later.
The advantages of an early lead vanish quickly when facing a competitor with
higher positive feedbacks. If that early lead is established at a cost to the firm, it
may disappear before there is a chance for the investment to pay off. However, as
we show in the following section, these implications are not robust in the extended
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5 Uncertainty
We now extend our analysis by including stochastic feedbacks and analyzing their
effect on strategic behavior. Before undertaking that analysis, two comments are
in order: one theoretical and one pragmatic. First, recall from the generalized urn
model in Section 2 that in the long run stochastic feedbacks don’t matter (Theorem
1): the firm with the highest mean feedbacks will dominate the market, regardless
of feedback variability. That result does not imply that stochastic feedbacks are
irrelevant to the strategic choice between investing in quality or initial advantage,
particularly in the short run. In fact, we find that when feedbacks are noisy, initial
advantage can outweigh quality differences for a very long time, enough so that
pursuing an initial advantage and not higher quality is the better strategy.
This raises the pragmatic question of when we would expect feedbacks to be
more or less certain. One would expect feedbacks that result from production
externalities, returns to scale, learning by doing, etc... to be less variable. Though
the urn model does not explicitly include price, the increased demand for one
firm over another could be interpreted as resulting from one firm having a lower
price. One would also expect feedbacks in the form of complementarities with
other new products to be more certain – demand for a gaming station increases
as software developers create more games. More uncertain feedbacks will occur
on the demand side. Feedbacks would be expected to have higher variance if the
market for the product contains heterogeneous consumers, and if those consumers
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predispositions to create social spillovers.
For many products, feedbacks will include both stable and stochastic sources.
Consider the market for environmentally safe waterproof fabrics, which includes
outerwear and upholstery. If two firms introduce new fabrics, each will experience
relatively constant feedbacks on the production side such as returns to scale or
technological learning curve advancements. The social feedbacks, though, might
be high variance, particularly in the outerwear market. Our results will show that
the level of feedback uncertainty has implications for strategic choice.
To examine the effect of feedback uncertainty, we repeat the computational
experiment of Section 4, but with uncertain rather than fixed feedbacks. We again
examine two competing firms, “IA” and “Q,” and we keep the expected feedbacks
the same as the fixed feedbacks of Section 4, but now rather than receiving a fixed
feedback ρi with probability one (where the value of ρi depends on the strategy of
firm i), the firms receive nρi with probability 1/n. Thus, the mean feedbacks are
kept the same as in the computations in Section 4, but the variance is increased.
In other words, these new feedbacks are a mean preserving spread of the previous
feedbacks.
We run the model 1000 times for varying values of n and again examine the
median shares of the two firms after 10,000 sales. Figure 2 depicts the results. In
the right panel of Figure 1, we saw that with certain feedbacks a 30% feedback
advantage was sufficient to beat a five fold initial advantage. When feedbacks are
uncertain Figure 2 tells a different story. In the left panel when feedbacks occur
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Firm Q Median Share After 10000 Sales
 Feedback Probability 1/4
Firm Q Feedback









Firm Q Median Share After 10,000 Sales
 Feedback probability 1/10
Firm Q Feedback




Figure 2: Initial advantage versus Quality (level of feedback) when feedbacks are
uncertain. Firm Q has average feedbacks ranging from 1 to 2 shown on the hor-
izontal axis. Firm IA has average feedback 1 and an equal, double, or five-fold
initial advantage represented by the three lines in the graph. In the left panel feed-
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Firm IA Median Share After 10,000 Sales
Uncertainty Parameter n





  Initial Advantage
5x
2x
Figure 3: The benefits of the initial advantage strategy as a function of feedback
uncertainty. Firm IA has either a two fold or five fold initial advantage and feed-
backs n with probability 1/n. The competing firm, Firm Q, has feedbacks 1.5n
with probability 1/n.
advantage to best a firm with a five fold initial advantage. In the right panel, when
feedbacks occur for an average of one out of ten sales then even a firm with just
double the initial advantage beats all of the tested quality strategies.
Figure 3 gives a different perspective on how the benefits of an initial ad-
vantage strategy change with the level of uncertainty. The figure plots the median
share of Firm IA when competing against Firm Q as the level of uncertainty varies.
Firm IA has either a two fold or five fold initial advantage and feedbacks n with
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figure illustrates, the more uncertain the feedbacks, the more beneficial an early
advantage becomes. A five fold initial advantage beats the quality strategy as soon
as feedbacks occur for fewer than one in three purchases. If feedbacks occur with
probability 1/10, then a five fold initial advantage is sufficient to maintain near
complete market dominance after 10,000 sales in more than half of the simula-
tions.
One way to understand why this occurs is by invoking the logic of the central
limit theorem. The firm that has the initial advantage makes a sufficient number of
sales to get an average positive feedback. The late entrant does not. For example,
the firm with the initial advantage may get twenty sales in the first twenty five
periods whereas the other firm gets only five. The variance in average feedback
for the first firm will be much lower. Even if the second firm has higher quality,
that higher quality might not produce higher average feedbacks for any given five
draws. In effect, because the firm with the initial advantage gets lots of initial
sales, it faces less uncertainty.
6 Consistency as a Strategic Choice
In Sections 3.1 and 3.2 we discuss how standard economic intuition applies in the
urn model framework: increasing a firm’s initial state or mean feedbacks increases
its expected sales in any finite time. In the previous section, we demonstrated us-
ing computational results that which of these strategies is most likely to succeed
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and Page (2012) proved using a model similar to the one in this paper that more
consistent feedbacks also result in higher expected market share, so just as time
to market and product quality can be viewed as strategic choices so too can feed-
back consistency. Their theorem, stated formally below, shows that second order
stochastic dominance is a sufficient condition for one distribution of uncertain pos-
itive feedbacks to result in higher expected market share than another. Thus, the
firm with more consistent feedbacks will have higher expected sales even when a
purchase of either product produces the same feedback in expectation.
Theorem 2. (Lamberson and Page, 2012) Suppose two firms, A and B, start in
the initial state S = (1, 1) and have transition weights ρ = (ρA, ρB). Let F be
the cumulative distribution function for ρA and G be the cumulative distribution
function for ρB, and suppose that F second order stochastically dominates G.






for any nondecreasing concave function h (this is equivalent to the statement G is
a mean preserving spread of F ).4 Then
X̄TA [S, ρ] > X̄
T
B [S, ρ] (5)
for any T ≥ 2.
4Interestingly, Theorem 2 contrasts with existing results on diffusion in networks. Generally,
networks with more variable degree distributions, i.e. hubs and spokes, are more conducive to
diffusion than networks in which each node has a similar number of connections (Lamberson,
2011, 2015). The difference in the urn model is due to the “dilution” effect that occurs when more
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Theorem 2 reveals an asymmetry between cost reductions and social influence.
As previously mentioned, cost reductions through economies of scale should pro-
duce certain positive feedbacks. In contrast, social influence produces variable
feedbacks. Theorem 2 implies that if equal in expected level of positive feedback,
increasing returns to scale will have a larger effect on sales than social influence.
More generally, if different types of positive feedbacks differ in their distributions,
so too will they differ in their effect sizes.
Consumer heterogeneity can also create variation in feedbacks from word-
of-mouth. Heterogeneity may differ across product classes or even within a class.
Consider a mainstream action movie that appeals to almost everyone to a moderate
degree. We might assume each person who sees the film recommends it to one
other friend. Contrast this with an edgy independent documentary that appeals to
a niche market. Within that market, suppose that some love the film and others
find it too avant garde. Perhaps only one in ten audience members who see the
film recommend it, but that each of these recommends the film to ten of their
friends.
The theorem implies that although the two films have identical expected so-
cial effects, in expectation the action film will produce a larger spillover. If we
assume the initial audience were of identical size, the action film should outsell
the documentary.
The market dominance of the action film occurs from variation in social influ-
ence. If consumers are less likely to view the documentary independently of the
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success of the movies.
Notice that this same conclusion applies to novel product categories where
consumers know little about the item until they bring it home and try it or learn
from someone who has. Easy to use products may have a market advantage over
more complicated products even if the added complexity results in greater ben-
efits. Increasing ease of use, a strategy that Apple has pursued relentlessly, in-
creases consistency of feedback and sales.5
Relatedly, a firm might influence the certainty of positive feedbacks by mak-
ing their product more recognizable, what Jonah Berger calls making the product
“public” (Berger, 2016). Many successful products in industries with strong pos-
itive feedbacks have distinctive visual designs that make it certain they will be
recognized, like the white ear buds of an iPod (McFedries, 2005) or the distinc-
tive shape of a Toyota Prius. The previous theorem implies that a product with
high but randomly recognized positive feedback can be outsold by a more recog-
nizable product with lower feedbacks – even when in expectation the feedback
levels are the same.
A final implication concerns quality control. Imagine two competing restau-
rants, Sometimes Amazing and Always Decent. The two restaurants depend on
reputation through word-of-mouth to generate business. The chef at Sometimes
5Examples from Apple include development of the computer mouse for popular use (Gladwell,
2011) and the touch screen interface of the iPhone. Steve Jobs, Apple’s longtime CEO was quoted
as saying, “The main thing in our design is that we have to make things intuitively obvious.”
Famously, in designing the Apple iPod, Job’s demanded that any function should be reachable in
three intuitive clicks. “If he couldn’t figure out how to navigate to something, or if it took more
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Amazing is hit or miss; the lucky customers that come on one of her “on days”
will recommend it to anyone they meet, while those that come on an off day are
unlikely to mention their lackluster meal. At Always Decent the food is consis-
tently good, but never outstanding. Everyone that goes there recommends it to a
few close friends, but doesn’t go out of their way to share their experience. Theo-
rem 2 says that even if, on average, customers of either restaurant recommend it to
the same number of people, Always Decent will outperform Sometimes Amazing.
A similar dynamic could play out in many service industries such as banking or
insurance. Variation in quality will also affect demand for non-service products
such as laptop computers or automobiles; it is not just the average quality of these
products that counts, but also the variance in quality.
When compared to the initial advantage strategy and the quality strategy, re-
ducing variation in feedbacks has a surprisingly strong effect. Figure 4 shows
what happens when a firm taking an initial advantage strategy (left panel) or a
quality strategy (right panel) competes against a firm with constant feedbacks. The
left panel shows the median share of Firm IA after 10,000 purchases from 1000
simulations in which Firm IA has either an equal, two fold, or five fold initial ad-
vantage, but has feedbacks n with probability 1/n, while the competing firm has
fixed feedbacks 1 with probability 1. Once feedbacks become sufficiently uncer-
tain, reducing uncertainty is more effective than establishing an initial advantage.
Thus, if getting to market early comes at the cost of feedback consistency, a firm
may do best to wait. The right panel tells a similar story when comparing a firm
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Figure 4: Left panel: Median share of Firm IA after 10,000 purchases from 1000
simulations in which Firm IA has either an equal, two fold, or five fold initial ad-
vantage, and has feedbacks n with probability 1/n, while the competing firm has
fixed feedbacks 1 with probability 1. Right panel: Median share of Firm Q after
10,000 purchases from 1000 simulations in which Firm Q has feedbacks αn with
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with probability 1/n and competes against a firm with feedbacks 1 with probabil-
ity 1. As the graph shows, in some cases its more important to be consistent than
better.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we construct a class of models of firm competition with positive
feedbacks and use analytic and computational methods to compare two strategies:
gaining an initial advantage or improving product quality. The conventional wis-
dom holds that increasing initial advantage through aggressive marketing tactics
can be costly in the short run, but these expenses can be recouped by later sales to
locked-in customers (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). When feedbacks are certain, we
find the conventional wisdom incorrect: the benefits of increasing initial market
presence are short lived relative to those from increasing the level of feedbacks.
When feedbacks are variable, early entry produces larger returns.
We can infer from that second finding that higher quality firms should seek
consistent feedbacks by reducing variation in product quality and in consumers’
experiences. Kalish and Lilien (1986) quote a cautionary tale from Peters and
Waterman, Jr. (1982) that illustrates the potential pitfalls of choosing the initial
advantage strategy at the expense of quality and consistency:
We rushed to the market with a new product because it was clearly a
superior technical device. We wanted to grab market share quickly.
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is now down below eight percent, while we should have had thirty or
thirty-five percent of the market. A six month delay in introduction to
iron out the bugs would have done it. Damn it. (Peters and Waterman,
Jr., 1982, p. 179)
The failure of the extant literature to consider variation in feedback might
seem puzzling given the general acceptance of quality control as a key strategic
element and the magnitude of its effect in our model. However, keep in mind that
introducing feedback uncertainty in isolation produces no long run effect when
analyzing the impact of either initial advantage or quality independently.
However, as we show here, when we analyze markets in which products can
differ in both quality and time to market, i.e. almost all markets, feedback vari-
ation becomes a key strategic lever. Firms benefit from improved quality control
and from reducing variation in consumptive value. Consistent messaging and
branding that reduce feedback variation will help to maintain market share.
Our findings also have implications for firms who target new products to the
more extreme population of “early adopters” hoping to gain momentum from
positive feedbacks that propel the product to break into the mainstream (Danko
and MacLachlan, 1983; Rogers, 2003). Our model suggests that this would only
be a prudent strategy with homogenous early adopters. If the preferences of
early adopters differ from one another or from those of the mainstream mar-
ket (Hawkins, Roger and Coney, 1989; Moore, 1999; Slater and Mohr, 2006),
a targeted approach increases the variation in positive feedbacks with the early
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Faith in these strategic insights must be tempered by an awareness of the high
level of abstraction of the urn model. Abstract, simple models have both strengths
and weaknesses. On the one hand, by leaving out the specific details regarding the
mechanism that generates the feedbacks, they enable the establishment of general
results that apply to any situation in which the purchase of a product increases the
likelihood of future purchases. On the other hand, by not including details such
as pricing, and costs of production, research and development, and advertising on
the supply side, and by omitting any fine grained assumptions about consumer
preference on the demand side, the models cannot be used to analyze more nu-
anced production, marketing, and branding strategies. That said, it is possible
to draw further insights from the model. For example, if increasing the level of
feedbacks in a particular industry has high costs, then the potential effectiveness
of that strategic option is limited. Or, if a firm can quickly make product changes
after the initial rollout to improve quality or better match consumer preferences,
then our findings would suggest that they would command a much larger market
share.
An interesting avenue for future research is the inclusion of strategic pricing.
Pricing might well be used, as in the insulated competition literature described in
the introduction, to overcome disadvantages faced by a firm in our simple model.
For example, low prices could subsidize consumer switching to a late entrant when
a competitor has an established initial advantage. Similarly, when feedbacks are
uncertain, prices could serve to help stabilize demand and network effects. This
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use “surge pricing” to ensure predictable availability of rides.6
As information goods make up an increasingly large portion of the global
economy, these insights are more important than ever. Positive feedbacks in their
many forms – network externalities, learning curves, information cascades, in-
creasing returns, and social learning – have always been present in markets, but
in economies that consist primarily of physical goods limitations on production
act as a brake on their effects. Producers who benefit from positive feedbacks
can raise prices, or in the case of automobile companies, not offer discounts, but
manufacturing constraints limit the extent to which they can exploit positive feed-
backs, which in turn limits the strategic significance of the feedbacks. In these
industries a firm that grows too fast can overshoot their capacity resulting in a
rapid decline (Sterman, Henderson, Beinhocker and Newman, 2007).7
In contrast, weightless goods (Coyle, 1999), which occupy a growing share of
the market, suffer from little or no production constraints. When the online game
Monument Valley was featured on the hit show House of Cards in late February
2015, the very next day its iPhone games sales rank leapt from outside the top
twenty-five games to the top five (Michaeli, 2015). To meet this demand, no new
plants had to be opened, no new shifts had to be added, and no supply chains had to
be brokered. Any and all positive feedbacks that accrued from the product place-
ment could be instantly exploited. The ability to gain the full benefit of positive
6We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this potential model extension and the surge
pricing example.
7A similar dynamic can play out in service industries. See for example the classic business
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feedbacks in the weightless economy combined with increased virtual networking
that amplifies social influence make understanding strategies for competing in the
presence of positive feedbacks essential for today’s managers.
We conclude on a cautionary note. Positive feedback “new” economy thinking
suggests the importance of being first to market. Some of that intuition was based
on empirical observation and some was built on stark models of increasing returns.
As we showed in the paper, being first to market may create less long term value
than having the better product. Standard economic logic – lower prices, higher
quality – holds sway in a richer model.
And yet, when we add uncertainty, the results reversed. Early entry again mat-
ters. With variable feedbacks, being first to market mattered more because getting
market share, in effect, reduces the effect of uncertainty. The logic, as we covered
in detail, relies on the central limit theorem: Early market share means that you
get more draws, so the sample mean approximates the true mean. Overall, our
results suggest no one size fits all intuition. Optimal strategies will be contingent
on market specifics and on the mechanisms that produce the positive feedbacks.
A Arthur’s Urn Model
In the model of lock-in described by Arthur (1989), the process also begins with
an urn that initially contains one red and one blue ball. In this model, balls in the
urn can be thought of as representing aggregate sales of the two firms. At each
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thus adding a ball of the corresponding color to the urn. The probability that the
color of the ball added at time t is red is given by a function ft(P tr) : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]
which depends on the time t and the proportion P tr of red balls in the urn at time t.
The probability that the added ball is blue is 1−ft(P tr). Arthur et al. (1983) prove
that, given some technical conditions, if the sequence of functions ft converge to
a function f , then P tr will converge to a stable fixed point of f . The Pólya process
is the special case of this model in which ft(P tr) = P
t
r (i.e. the probability of
adding a red ball is exactly equal to the proportion of red balls in the urn). In this
case, the ft are the same for all t and trivially converge to f(x) = x. Every point
x ∈ [0, 1] is a stable fixed point of this function, so any possible proportion of red
balls is a potential limit of the process.
















≤ P tr ≤ 12 + δt






One can interpret this model as capturing consumer choice in the following
way. Imagine that absent any positive feedbacks, each consumer has a preference
for either the red or the blue product. The constant α gives the fraction of con-
sumers of the red type. When both products command similar shares, consumers
purchase the product corresponding to their type, but when one of the products
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ing product. Once again, this could be because of network externalities, social
influence, or lower costs due to returns to scale.






0 if P tr <
1
2
α if P tr =
1
2




The only stable equilibria of this system occur at f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1,
and therefore the market converges to a “winner-take-all” outcome.8 The key to
producing lock-in is in the specification of the functions ft. In some sense, a ball
is never drawn from the urn – balls are only added to the urn as specified by ft.
Thresholds built in to the functions ft make the probability that a ball of a given
color is added become zero in finite time, which can never happen in the Pólya
process or the generalized Pólya process that we employ.
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Urn Schemes,” The Annals of Statistics, 1973, 1 (2), 353–355.
Cowan, Robin, “Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-in,”
The Journal of Economic History, 1990, 50 (3), 541–567.
and Philip Gunby, “Sprayed To Death: Path Dependence, Lock-in and Pest













This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Coyle, Diane, The weightless world: strategies for managing the digital economy,
MIT Press, 1999.
Danko, W.D. and J.M. MacLachlan, “Research to accelerate the diffusion of a
new invention,” Journal of Advertising Research, 1983, 23 (3), 39–43.
David, Paul A., “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,” The American Economic
Review, 1985, 75 (2), 332–337.
De Vany, Arthur and W. David Walls, “Bose-Einstein Dynamics and Adaptive
Contracting in the Motion Picture Industry,” The Economic Journal, 1996, 106
(439), 1493–1514.
Dybvig, Philip H and Chester S Spatt, “Adoption externalities as public goods,”
Journal of Public Economics, 1983, 20 (2), 231–247.
Farrell, Joseph and Garth Saloner, “Standardization, Compatibility, and Inno-
vation,” RAND Journal of Economics, 1985, 16 (1), 70–83.
and Paul Klemperer, “Coordination and Lock-in: Competition with Switch-
ing Costs and Network Effects,” Economics Papers 2006-W07, Economics
Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford 2006.
Fleder, Daniel and Kartik Hosanagar, “Blockbuster culture’s next rise or fall:
The impact of recommender systems on sales diversity,” Management Science,













This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole, “Pricing a network good to deter entry,” The Jour-
nal of Industrial Economics, 2000, 48 (4), 373–390.
Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole, “Learning-by-doing and market perfor-
mance,” The Bell Journal of Economics, 1983, 14 (2), 522–530.
Ghemawat, P. and M. Spence, “Learning Curve Spillovers and Market Perfor-
mance,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1985, 100 (5), 839–852.
Gladwell, Malcolm, “Creation Myth: Xerox PARC, Apple, and the truth about
innovation,” The New Yorker, 2011, May 6.
Greenberg, D., “Modeling Criminal Careers,” Criminology, 1991, 29, 17–46.
Grindley, Peter, “Winning standards contests: using product standards in busi-
ness strategy,” Business Strategy Review, 1990, 1 (1), 71–84.
Hawkins, D.I., J. Roger, and K.A. Coney, Consumer Behavior: Implications for
Marketing Strategy, BPI/Irwin, 1989.
Hossain, Tanjim and John Morgan, “The quest for QWERTY,” The American
Economic Review, 2009, 99 (2), 435–440.
Isaacson, Walter, “How Steve Job’s Love of Simplicty Fueled a Computer Rev-
olution,” Smithsonian Magazine, 2012, September.
Johnson, Norman Lloyd and Samuel Kotz, Urn Models and Their Application:













This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Kalish, Shlomo and Gary L Lilien, “A market entry timing model for new tech-
nologies,” Management Science, 1986, 32 (2), 194–205.
Katz, Michael L. and Carl Shapiro, “Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility,” The American Economic Review, 1985, 75 (3), 424–440.
Khanin, Kostya and Raya Khanin, “A Probabilistic Model for the Establishment
of Neuron Polarity,” Journal of Mathematical Biology, 2001, 42 (1), 26–40.
Lamberson, P. J., “Linking Network Structure and Diffusion Through Stochastic
Dominance,” Connections, 2011, 31 (1).
, “Diffusion in Networks,” in “The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Net-
works,” Oxford University Press, 2015.
and Scott E Page, “The effect of feedback consistency on success in markets
with positive feedbacks,” Economics Letters, 2012, 114 (3), 259–261.
Levene, Mark, Trevor Fenner, George Loizou, and Richard Wheeldon, “A
Stochastic Model for the Evolution of the Web,” Computer Networks, 2002, 39,
277–287.
LiCalzi, Marco and Oktay Surucu, “The power of diversity over large solution
spaces,” Management Science, 2012, 58 (7), 1408–1421.
Liebowitz, S. J. and Stephen E. Margolis, “The Fable of the Keys,” Journal of













This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
and , “Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy,” The Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives, 1994, 8 (2), 133–150.
and , “Path Dependance, Lock-in, and History,” Journal of Law, Economics
and Organization, 1995, 11 (1), 205–226.
Liebowitz, SJ and S. Margolis, Winners, Losers & Microsoft, Independent Insti-
tute, 2001.
McFedries, P., “Technically Speaking: The iPod People,” Spectrum, IEEE, 2005,
42 (2), 76–76.
Michaeli, Ariel, “House of Cards Stacks the Deck for Monument Valley’s
Success Across Major App Stores,” http://blog.appfigures.com/house-of-
cards-stacks-the-deck-for-monument-valleys-success-across-major-app-stores/
March 3 2015.
Moore, G.A., Crossing the Chasm: Marketing and Selling High-tech Products to
Mainstream Customers, HarperBusiness, 1999.
Page, Scott E., “Path Dependence,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2006,
1, 87–115.
Pemantle, Robin, “A Survey of Random Processes with Reinforcement,” Proba-
bility Surveys, 2007, 4, 1–79.
Peters, Thomas J. and Robert H. Waterman, Jr., In Search of Excellence, New













This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
Rogers, Everett M., Diffusion of Innovations, New York: Simon & Schuster,
2003.
Shapiro, Carl and Hal R. Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the
Network Economy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School press, 1999.
Slater, S.F. and J.J. Mohr, “Successful Development and Commercialization of
Technological Innovation: Insights Based on Strategy Type,” Journal of Prod-
uct Innovation Management, 2006, 23 (1), 26–33.
Spence, A, “The Learning Curve and Competition,” The Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics, Apr 1981, 12 (1), 49–70.
Spence, A Michael, “Investment strategy and growth in a new market,” J.
Reprints Antitrust L. & Econ., 1979, 10, 345.
Sterman, John D., Rebecca Henderson, Eric D. Beinhocker, and Lee I. New-
man, “Getting Big Too Fast: Strategic Dynamics with Increasing Returns and
Bounded Rationality,” Management Science, 2007, 53 (4), 683–696.
Watts, Duncan J and Steve Hasker, “Marketing in an Unpredictable World,”
Harvard Business Review, 2006, 84 (9), 25–30.
Weyl, E Glen, “A price theory of multi-sided platforms,” The American Economic













This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
and Alexander White, “Let the Right ’One’ Win: Policy Lessons from the
New Economics of Platforms,” Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law
and Economics, 2014, (709).
White, Alexander and E Glen Weyl, “Insulated platform competition,” Avail-
able at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1694317 2016.
40
